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 Market Structure and Racial Earnings:
 Evidence from Job-Changers
 By JACQUELINE AGESA, RICHARD U. AGESA, AND GARY A. HOOVER*
 In his seminal contribution, Gary Becker
 (1957) suggests that rents in noncompetitive
 industries provide employers with the latitude
 to engage in earnings discrimination. Implicit in
 this theory, is that white workers in noncompet-
 itive industries would capture a disproportion-
 ate share of monopoly rents (excessive wages)
 relative to their minority counterparts.1
 Previous studies that have examined market
 structure and earnings discrimination utilize a
 cross-sectional approach, which compares the
 racial wage gap in highly concentrated noncom-
 petitive industries with the gap in less concen-
 trated competitive industries, yielding mixed
 results (see James Peoples [1994] for a review
 of this literature). However, noncompetitive in-
 dustries pay higher wages and may attract more-
 productive workers. A shortcoming of this
 approach, therefore, is that unmeasured pro-
 ductivity differences between workers in non-
 competitive and competitive industries could
 partially explain differences in earnings under
 different market structures. Consequently, these
 analyses may provide distorted estimates of the
 relationship between market concentration and
 racial earnings.
 This study augments the above literature by
 investigating the relationship between market
 concentration and racial earnings using data sets
 that rectify the measurement problem of pro-
 ductivity differences between workers under
 opposing market structures. Specifically, two
 samples of workers who have changed employ-
 ment are used to examine earnings by race of
 workers in pre- and post-employment-change
 industries. The research methods resemble
 those of Janice F. Madden's (1987) study of
 cost of job displacement by gender.
 If noncompetitive industries engage in racial
 earnings discrimination, then wages of white
 workers in these industries would be above the
 market wage; wages of minority workers would
 be below. Therefore, we would expect that
 white workers who leave noncompetitive indus-
 tries experience substantially greater earnings
 loss than if they had remained in noncompeti-
 tive industries relative to their minority coun-
 terparts. Similarly, we would expect greater
 earnings gains for white workers from joining
 noncompetitive industries, than from remaining
 in competitive industries, relative to minorities.
 Moreover, this would indicate that whites in
 noncompetitive industries are disproportion-
 ately the beneficiaries of labor rent-sharing rel-
 ative to their minority co-workers.
 We utilize wage-change equations to exam-
 ine earnings shifts for whites and minorities
 stemming from a job switch to a different mar-
 ket structure. Additionally for each racial group,
 wage equations of workers before and after
 the job change are used to calculate difference-
 in-differences estimates of wage change as a result
 of the job switch. The findings contradict the
 stated hypothesis: gains in minority wages from
 joining noncompetitive industries and losses in
 wages from leaving are larger, suggesting that (for
 minorities) the higher, less discriminatory wages
 of union employment in noncompetitive indus-
 tries outweigh employer discrimination in non-
 union, noncompetitive industries.
 I. Data and Methodology
 This study uses individual data from two
 sources. The first is the 1984-1998 biannual
 Displaced Worker Survey (DWS) supplement
 to the Current Population Survey (CPS). This
 constructed data set consists of workers aged
 16 and older who were displaced from and
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 reemployed in manufacturing industries, yield-
 ing a sample of 274 minority and 2,135 white
 workers. An advantage of using displaced
 workers in measuring wage change is that, be-
 cause job change is involuntary (exogenous), it
 is not the result of workers' expectations about
 the availability of better jobs. A disadvantage,
 however, is that only a fraction of survey appli-
 cants provide pre-displacement earnings, result-
 ing in the small sample sizes.
 The second source of data is matched sam-
 ples of manufacturing workers in the CPS
 Outgoing Rotation Groups (ORG's) from
 1984 to 1998. A unique feature of the ORG's
 is that workers appear in the survey twice (12
 months apart). Past researchers have used this
 feature to create panel data of workers; how-
 ever, a disadvantage of using the constructed
 CPS panel is that some job switches may be
 endogenous. Nevertheless, Barry Hirsch and
 David Macpherson (1998) argue that the sym-
 metry in wage change of entering and leaving
 the tested group (in our case, noncompetitive
 markets) is evidence of the relative unimpor-
 tance of endogenous switching.2 This match-
 ing procedure yields 1,632 minority and
 12,762 white workers who have changed em-
 ployment over the 12 months between survey
 appearances.
 Bridged to each data set of individual work-
 ers are measures of industry characteristics from
 the 1987 and 1992 Census of Manufacturers
 (Bureau of the Census, 1989, 1994). Industry
 characteristics from the 1987 Census were used to
 describe a worker's pre-employment-change in-
 dustry, if the worker's first job ended before
 1992, while the 1992 Census was used for all
 occurring thereafter. Characteristics of the post-
 employment industry were assigned similarly.
 Industry characteristics include the pre- and
 post-change capital-to-labor ratio (KIL = [in-
 dustry gross book value of plant and equip-
 ment]/[industry employment]) and plant size
 (= [industry employment]/[number of establish-
 ments]). Four firm concentration ratios, also
 taken from the Census, were converted from
 four-digit to three-digit SIC industry coding by
 weighing the industry value of shipments. A
 switching regression technique was used to bi-
 furcate employees into high-concentration, non-
 competitive industries and low-concentration,
 competitive industries. The critical concentra-
 tion ratio was taken to be 40 percent. The CPI,
 used to deflate pre- and post-employment earn-
 ings to 1985 dollars, was taken from Economic
 Report of the President 1998 (Council of Eco-
 nomic Advisers, 1998).
 The specification employed resembles previ-
 ous studies of wage change after a job switch
 (Henry Farber, 1993). However, separate equa-
 tions are used to estimate wages of minorities
 and whites, allowing a different structure of
 real-wage change for the two groups, specified
 as follows:
 (1) AWi =aXi + b(NC_C) + c(NC_C)
 + d(C_NC) + Ei
 where A Wi is the change in the log of real
 weekly wages from pre- to post-employment
 in 1985 dollars. The vector X includes indi-
 vidual and industry controls that determine
 wage change. Using the DWS, vector X in-
 cludes age and its square, years of tenure in
 the pre-displacement job, six dummies for
 educational attainment, three dummies indi-
 cating region of employment, and four dum-
 mies indicating pre- and post-occupational
 group. Other individual controls include dum-
 mies for full- and part-time status in pre- and
 post-employment, gender, and marital status.
 Industry variables are included in X to control
 for the effects of changes in industry charac-
 teristics from the pre- to the post-employment
 industry on earnings change for each racial
 group. They include the change in the capital-
 to-labor ratio and the change in plant size.
 Dummies that account for the change in
 market structure include NC_C, for workers
 who moved from noncompetitive to compet-
 itive industries. Similarly, the other market-
 structure dummies are NC_NC and C_NC,
 with workers moving from competitive to
 competitive industries as the base group. The
 coefficient on each variable captures the ef-
 fect of that variable on earnings changes for
 2 For each racial group, the symmetry of wage change is
 illustrated by the relative equality of wage differences (in
 absolute value) of workers leaving and entering noncom-
 petitive markets (see columns b and d of Table 2).
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 TABLE 1-WAGE CHANGE OF INDIVIDUALS WHO
 CHANGED EMPLOYMENT
 DWS Matched CPS
 Independent White Minority White Minority
 variable (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
 KIL -0.008 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004
 (-0.94) (-0.16) (-0.57) (0.05)
 Plant size -0.032t 0.004 -0.002t -0.003
 (2.1) (0.12) (1.8) (0.97)
 NC_NC -0.051 -0.217 -0.011 0.011
 (-0.69) (-1.1) (0.89) (0.31)
 NC_C -0.181 -0.788t -0.019 -0.014
 (-1.0) (-1.7) (1.0) (0.31)
 C_NC -0.093 -1.14t -0.022 -0.075S
 (-0.53) (-1.8) (1.42) (1.7)
 Dummies for:
 Previous years yes yes no no
 of tenure
 Geographic yes yes yes yes
 region
 Full or part time yes yes yes yes
 Human capital yes yes yes yes
 Year in sample yes yes yes yes
 Occupation yes yes yes yes
 Union status no no yes yes
 R 2: 0.328 0.482 0.023 0.021
 Sample size: 2,135 274 12,762 1,632
 Notes: NC indicates noncompetitive, and C indicates competitive industry. Thus
 NC_C inidicates that the worker switched from a noncompetitive to a compet-
 itive industry. The other two variants of pre- and post-job change in market
 structure follow a similar pattern, with workers switching from competitive to
 competitive industries as the base group. KIL is the capital-to-labor ratio.
 Numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 Source: Displaced-worker data were taken from the biannual Displaced
 Worker Supplement to the CPS, 1984-1998. Matched CPS manufacturing-
 worker data were taken from the CPS ORG, 1984-1998.
 t Statistically significant at the 10-percent level.
 that racial group. The coefficients on the change-
 in-market-structure dummies are key because they
 measure the earnings change in moving to and
 from noncompetitive and competitive industries,
 relative to workers who stay in competitive indus-
 tries, for each racial group.
 Using the constructed CPS panel, the vector
 X differs from the above in that it does not
 include a control for years of tenure in the
 previous occupation. However, dummies for
 union status in pre- and post-change employ-
 ment are included.
 II. Findings
 Columns (i) and (ii) of Table 1 present the
 earnings change for each racial group [equation
 (1)] using the DWS sample. An increase in plant
 size from the displacement to the reemployment
 industry significantly decreases earnings loss for
 whites, while it insignificantly increases the loss
 for minorities.3 Of central importance are the re-
 sults for the change in market-structure dummies.
 For minorities whose initial employment is in
 competitive industries, joining a noncompetitive
 industry significantly reduces earnings loss by 68
 percentage points relative to remaining in compet-
 itive industries [see coefficients on C_NC, in col-
 umn (ii)]. By contrast, joining a noncompetitive
 industry insignificantly reduces earnings loss of
 whites by 8.8 percentage points relative to remain-
 ing in a competitive industry [see coefficients on
 NC_C, in column (i)]. The t test of the difference
 between the NC_NC and NC_C variables for
 white displaced workers fails to reject the hy-
 pothesis of equal wage loss for noncompetitive-
 industry non-leavers and leavers; the t statistic is
 -0.78. The t test of the difference between mi-
 nority non-leavers and leavers in noncompetitive
 industries just barely fails to reject the hypothesis
 of equal wage loss between the two groups, yield-
 ing a t statistic of -1.5.
 Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 1 present the
 wage-change estimates using the CPS matched
 panel. An increase in plant size for whites
 significantly reduces earnings loss by 0.03
 percentage points, while it insignificantly influ-
 ences wage changes for minorities. The market-
 structure dummies are insignificant in both the
 white and minority equations, with the ex-
 ception of the significant coefficient on C_NC,
 for minority workers moving from competitive
 to noncompetitive industries. Indeed, joining a
 noncompetitive industry significantly reduces
 earnings loss for minorities, by 7.2 percentage
 points. Moreover, earnings change for minori-
 ties in the matched CPS panel and the DWS
 indicates earnings gains in noncompetitive in-
 dustries (relative to competitive industries) that
 are not a result of increased human-capital in-
 vestment. These findings suggest that minorities
 are beneficiaries of labor rent-sharing.
 Next, the CPS ORG panels are divided
 into the four variants of the job-switch
 market-structure groupings (NC_C, NC-NC,
 3The conversion into percentage differentials is given by
 (ecoefficient - 1) X 100.
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 TABLE 2-DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES
 OF WAGES (IN PERCENTAGE POINTS)
 A. Workers Leaving Noncompetitive-Industry Jobs:
 NC-NC NC_C
 Racial group (a) (b) (b) - (a)
 Minority (M) 6.41 -12.51 -18.92
 White (W) 5.07 -3.77 -8.84
 Difference
 (M - W): 1.34 -8.74
 B. Workers Leaving Comnpetitive-Industry Jobs:
 C_C C_NC
 Racial group (c) (d) (d) - (c)
 Minority (M) 1.16 15.16 14.00
 White (W) -2.03 5.52 7.55
 Difference
 (M - W): 3.16 9.64
 Note: See notes to Table 1 for definitions of NC_NC,
 NC_C, C_C, and C_NC.
 Source: CPS ORG panel, 1984-1998.
 C_C, and C_NC) for each racial group. Sep-
 arate wage equations are estimated for each
 sample before and after the job change. Such
 a procedure removes the fixed-effects restric-
 tion on earnings changes for workers entering
 and leaving noncompetitive industries and al-
 lows a separate earnings structure before and
 after the job switch and by market structure.
 Further, the procedure allows difference-in-
 differences estimates of the difference in
 wage change for minorities and whites enter-
 ing and leaving noncompetitive industries.
 Findings of the difference-in-differences pro-
 cedure are presented in Table 2. Earnings losses
 for minorities and whites leaving noncompeti-
 tive industries are 12.51 and 3.77 percentage
 points respectively. Further, leaving a noncom-
 petitive industry causes a 18.92-percentage-
 point greater earnings loss for minorities and a
 8.84-percentage-point greater loss for whites
 than the loss of workers belonging to each
 racial group remaining in a noncompetitive in-
 dustry. Additionally, movement to a noncom-
 petitive industry invokes earnings gains of
 15.16 and 5.52 percentage points for minorities
 and whites, respectively, with minorities and
 whites experiencing 14.0- and 7.55-percentage-
 point larger gains than those in competitive
 industries.
 III. Conclusions
 Past empirical testing of the relationship
 between market structure and racial earnings
 has involved two sources of distorting mea-
 surement error: error resulting from un-
 observed differences between workers in
 noncompetitive and competitive industries
 and error resulting from unobserved differ-
 ences between white and minority workers.
 This study utilized two data sets of employ-
 ment-changers to examine workers' earnings
 under opposing market structure, thereby
 eliminating the first error source. Elimination
 of the latter would be daunting because it
 would entail observing workers' earnings if
 they were white and if they were minority.
 Our findings provide evidence of larger mi-
 nority wage gains from entering noncompet-
 itive industries and greater loss from leaving,
 relative to whites. These findings may contra-
 dict the hypothesized relationship between ra-
 cial earnings and market structure for two
 reasons. First, noncompetitive industries are
 more unionized than competitive industries.
 Second, union employment offers higher
 and more standardized (i.e., less discrimina-
 tory) wages than does nonunion employment
 (Richard Freeman, 1980). Thus, minority
 wage gains in entering noncompetitive in-
 dustries are large because the effects of the
 increased likelihood of a higher, less discrim-
 inatory union wage outweighs employers'
 increased latitude to practice wage discrimi-
 nation in nonunion noncompetitive employ-
 ment. This interpretation is consistent with
 past cross-sectional findings of large racial
 wage gaps in nonunion employment in non-
 competitive industries and small, insignificant
 racial wage gaps for union members (Peoples,
 1994).
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